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INSURING FLOODS: THE MOST COMMON AND DEVASTATING
NATURAL CATASTROPHES IN AMERICA
CHRISTOPHER C. FRENCH*
I. INTRODUCTION
ALONG with houses and lives, Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy washedaway the illusion for yet another generation of Americans that sea-
walls and levees can keep us safe from flood waters.  Although the storm
surge damage caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy is indelibly etched
upon our minds due to the 24-hour media coverage and haunting images
of houses in ruins and people sitting on their roofs waiting to be rescued,
smaller-scale flooding disasters that do not get national attention occur
throughout the country every day.
Flooding is the most common catastrophe in America and the world,
accounting for approximately 90% of all catastrophic losses annually.1  For
the past thirty years in America, floods have on average caused more than
$8 billion in damages annually, and most of the damage is uninsured.2
Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy alone caused over $160 billion in damage.3
Yet, only about 10% of the victims of Hurricane Katrina had flood insur-
ance, and a little over 50% of Hurricane Sandy victims had flood insur-
ance even though the communities devastated by these hurricanes are
ones that obviously should be concerned about flooding because they are
located on or near rivers and the coast.  Even more sadly, much of the
losses suffered by even the relatively fortunate few who had flood insur-
* Christopher C. French is a Visiting Assistant Professor at Penn State Law
School; J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., Columbia University.  The Author
gratefully acknowledges the legal research contributions of Pat Roncevich and Kyle
Yeversky to the Essay, as well as the thoughtful comments provided by Ken
Abraham, Jay Feinman, David Kaye, Kit Kinports, Leo Martinez, Stephen Ross, and
the participants in a workshop held at Penn State Law School on earlier drafts of
the Essay.
1. See Shannon Doocy, Amy Daniels, Sarah Murray & Thomas D. Kirsch, The
Human Impact of Floods: A Historical Review of Events 1980–2009 and Systematic Litera-
ture Review, PLOS CURRENT DISASTERS (Apr. 16, 2013), http://currents.plos.org/
disasters/article/the-human-impact-of-floods-a-historical-review-of-events-1980-
2009-and-systematic-literature-review/ (discussing impacts of flooding).
2. See NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.’S NAT’L WEATHER SERV., Hy-
drologic Information Center—Flood Loss Data (Sept. 30, 2013) [hereinafter Flood Loss
Data], http://www.nws.noaa.gov/hic/.
3. See Christopher C. French, The Aftermath of Catastrophes: Valuing Business In-
terruption Insurance Losses, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 461, 463 (2014) (noting estimates
that Hurricane Sandy caused over $60 billion in damage); Christine A. Klein &
Sandra B. Zellmer, Mississippi River Stories: Lessons from a Century of Unnatural Disas-
ters, 60 SMU L. REV. 1471, 1499 (2007) (providing that Hurricane Katrina caused
approximately $100 billion in damage).
(53)
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ance through the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) were not ac-
tually covered by such insurance.
Despite dramatic nationwide media coverage of major flooding events
in large population centers such as New Orleans and New York, flooding is
actually a problem throughout the entire country.  Floods impact people
in every state.  And, floods will likely only become a worse problem, as
climate change could increase water levels and create more devastating
hurricanes and other storms.  Yet, it is estimated that only about 7% of all
homeowners in America have insurance for flood losses.4
The NFIP is the only significant source of flood insurance available to
homeowners in America, and the program has numerous deficiencies.
Every time there is a major flooding event, Congress revisits and attempts
to address the deficiencies that are exposed by the most recent flood.  This
pattern has been repeated multiple times over the past forty-six years since
the NFIP was created in 1968.  And each time, the result is the same: most
homeowners remain uninsured for flood losses and the insurance that is
available to cover flood losses is inadequate.
If the way flood losses are insured (or uninsured) in America is not
working, is there a better way?  This Essay maintains that the answer is
“yes.”  The simple, but underappreciated, solution offered in this Essay is
the elimination of the flood exclusion that is found in standard form “all
risk” homeowners insurance policies.
How is it even possible that the biggest and most common disaster
that can impact one’s home—flooding—is not already covered under “all
risk” homeowners insurance?  There are three principal theoretical bases
that insurers historically have used to justify excluding coverage for flood
damage under homeowners policies: (1) adverse selection, (2) moral haz-
ard, and (3) correlated risks.  Adverse selection is the idea that only the
people most likely to have losses will purchase insurance.5  Moral hazard
theory posits that a person who has insurance is less likely to take care to
avoid losses due to the fact that insurance will cover the losses.6  Corre-
4. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
5. Adverse selection is “the disproportionate tendency of those who are more
likely to suffer losses to seek insurance against those losses.”  Kenneth S. Abraham
& Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward a New
Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 102 n.82 (1993);
see also Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk Clas-
sification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 373, 375 (2003).  Some critics of the concept of
adverse selection have argued that insurers’ alleged concerns regarding the impact
that adverse selection actually has on policyholders’ behavior are overblown. See,
e.g., Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat,
113 YALE L.J. 1223 (2004).
6. The concept of moral hazard captures the intuitive idea that a policyholder
will have a “tendency to take fewer precautions in the presence of insurance.”
Adam F. Scales, Book Review, The Chicken and the Egg: Kenneth S. Abraham’s “The
Liability Century”, 94 VA. L. REV. 1259, 1263 (2008) (reviewing KENNETH S. ABRA-
HAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA
TO 9/11 45–48 (2008)).  Judge Easterbrook has described the theory underlying
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lated risks are risks that may result in numerous losses concentrated in
space and time.7  Due to the unpredictable nature of when correlated
risks will result in losses, insurers historically have claimed that they cannot
calculate and charge actuarially sound premiums for such risks.
When a risk simultaneously involves significant concerns related to
adverse selection, moral hazard, and correlated risks, insurers historically
have concluded the risk is either uninsurable or one they do not want to
insure.  Flooding is such a risk according to conventional insurance wis-
dom.  First, only the people most likely to suffer flood losses will purchase
insurance that covers only floods.  Thus, the pool of insureds that would
pay premiums to cover flood losses would be relatively small, and the pre-
miums that insurers would need to charge in order to cover the potential
losses would need to be extremely high, assuming actuarially-sound premi-
ums could be calculated at all.  Second, under moral hazard theory, a
homeowner who has insurance against flooding would not bother to avoid
or minimize flood losses or, at best, would take fewer measures to avoid or
minimize flood losses.  Third, flooding is a correlated risk because the
losses associated with flooding events tend to occur in concentrated geo-
graphic locations at or about the same time.
the concept by stating that “[o]nce a person has insurance, he will take more risks
than before because he bears less of the cost of his conduct.”  W. Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
W. World Ins. Co., 769 F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 1985).  The term “moral hazard”
also generally encompasses situations where “[a] person . . . deliberately causes a
loss . . . [or] exaggerates the size of a claim to defraud an insurer.” MARK S. DORF-
MAN, INTRODUCTION TO RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 480 (8th ed. 2005).  Nu-
merous scholars have written on moral hazard and have offered similar
descriptions of the concept. See, e.g., Scott E. Harrington, Prices and Profits in the
Liability Insurance Market, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 47 (Robert E. Litan
& Clifford Winston eds., 1988) (“Moral hazard is the tendency for the presence
and characteristics of insurance coverage to produce inefficient changes in buyers’
loss prevention activities, including carelessness and fraud . . . .”); ROBERT H. JERRY,
II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 12 (5th ed. 2012)
(“[T]he existence of insurance could have the perverse effect of increasing the
probability of loss. . . .  This phenomenon is called moral hazard.”); George L.
Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1547
(1987) (“Moral hazard refers to the effect of the existence of insurance itself on
the level of insurance claims made by the insured. . . . Ex ante moral hazard is the
reduction in precautions taken by the insured to prevent the loss, because of the
existence of insurance.”); Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and Economics of Tort Liability
Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 338 n.117 (1990) (“‘Moral hazard’ is sometimes
distinguished from ‘morale hazard,’ the former referring to deliberate acts like
arson, the latter to the mere relaxation of the defendant’s discipline of careful-
ness.” (citing C. ARTHUR WILLIAMS, JR. & RICHARD M. HEINS, RISK MANAGEMENT AND
INSURANCE 217 (4th ed. 1981))).
7. See Ve´ronique Bruggeman, Michael Faure & Tobias Heldt, Insurance Against
Catastrophe: Government Stimulation of Insurance Markets for Catastrophic Events, 23
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 185, 187 (2012); J. David Cummins, Should the Govern-
ment Provide Insurance for Catastrophes?, 88 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 337,
342–43 (2006); Adam F. Scales, A Nation of Policyholders: Governmental and Market
Failure in Flood Insurance, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 3, 10–11 (2006).
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Although this Essay does not purport, or even attempt, to address the
diverse political, environmental, and engineering issues that underlie the
problem of how we can or should prevent or minimize flooding in
America, it does address the problem of insuring against the risk of flood
losses.  It does so by questioning the soundness of the three historical justi-
fications—adverse selection, moral hazard, and correlated risks—that
have been used to explain why insurers should be allowed to refuse to
cover flood losses under homeowners policies.  This Essay concludes that,
even if they were once sound, the foundations for these justifications are
no longer solid.  If the theoretical justifications for insurers’ refusal to in-
sure flood losses are unsound, then a potential solution to America’s flood
insurance problem emerges: the elimination of the flood exclusion in
homeowners policies.
Homeowners insurance is a classic example of a situation where the
pool of insureds across which the risk of loss is spread is so large that
adverse selection is of little concern.  Ninety-six percent of homeowners
buy homeowners insurance because, in addition to risk aversion, the
purchase of such insurance is effectively mandatory in America today.
One cannot get a mortgage that is federally guaranteed, which most are,
without homeowners insurance.  Consequently, if flood losses were cov-
ered by homeowners insurance, then the pool of insureds across which the
risk of loss would be spread would be so enormous that adverse selection
regarding the purchase of insurance to cover flood losses would not be an
issue.
Similarly, moral hazard concerns regarding flood losses are relatively
low because of the enormous disruption and inconvenience that flooding
causes a homeowner.  Flooded homeowners not only lose irreplaceable
items of sentimental value, but they are often rendered homeless while
their houses are remediated and repaired.  Thus, people already have in-
centives to avoid flood losses, regardless of whether they have insurance.
Consequently, it stands to reason that, instead of putting the impetus on
individual homeowners to prevent flood damage to their homes by exclud-
ing coverage for floods in homeowners policies, a more efficient means of
avoiding or preventing flood losses would be through building codes and
land development restrictions.
The potentially disastrous financial consequences associated with the
correlated risk of flood losses for insurers also would be reduced, if not
entirely eliminated, if homeowners policies covered floods.  If coverage for
flood losses were bundled together with the other risks of loss covered
under homeowners insurance, then the risk of a flooding event causing an
enormous drain on insurers’ capital reserves, that could result in insolven-
cies, would be minimal because the capital reserves generated by the pre-
miums of 69 million homeowners with diverse risk profiles would be
enormous instead of using just the premiums generated by the 5.5 million
homeowners who currently are insured under the NFIP and primarily live
4
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in known flood areas.  In addition, through global reinsurance and catas-
trophe bonds, an insurer’s risk of insolvency due to flood events would be
further reduced because each individual insurer’s risk can be spread to
other insurers and investors.
This Essay addresses the problem of insuring flood losses in three
parts.  Part II provides a brief discussion of the history of flooding in
America and the creation of the NFIP in 1968, after private insurers began
refusing to cover flood losses.  Part II also addresses the theoretical ratio-
nales that historically have been used to justify insurers’ refusal to cover
flood losses.  Part III discusses the problems with the NFIP and Congress’s
ineffective attempts to solve those problems.  Part IV discusses the argu-
ments in favor of and against eliminating the flood exclusion that cur-
rently is contained in homeowners policies and considers how several
European countries have addressed the problem of insuring flood losses.
This Essay concludes that the elimination of the flood exclusion from
homeowners policies would address the problems with the NFIP while in-
creasing the number of American homeowners that have flood insurance
from 5.5 million to 69 million, without causing undue financial hardship
to insurers.
II. THE PROBLEM OF FLOODING AND THE ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL
FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM
A. The Flood Problem
Flooding is not a new problem in America that just emerged in the
last decade with Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy.  To the contrary, it is a
problem we have been dealing with since the first building was con-
structed in this country.  Every year, there is flooding somewhere.  In the
past thirty years alone, flooding has caused approximately $240 billion in
damage, for an average of approximately $8 billion annually.8
Flooding only causes “property damage,” however, if there is property
located in the area of the flooding.  Largely due to waterways historically
serving as a means of transportation, this country developed along water-
ways, with the largest cities and population centers located on the coasts or
along rivers.  With water comes periodic flooding despite mankind’s best
efforts to prevent it.  There are, of course, benefits that flow from Mother
Nature’s will that rivers and other waterways flood periodically.  Flooding
enriches the soil by bringing nutrients to the flooded area.9  Indeed, the
plains states are fertile farming lands because flooding from rivers such as
the Mississippi River periodically enriches the soil in the surrounding ar-
eas.10  Flooding also replenishes the sediments in downstream areas and
wetlands.11
8. See Flood Loss Data, supra note 2.
9. See Klein & Zellmer, supra note 3, at 1477; Scales, supra note 7, at 6.
10. See Klein & Zellmer, supra note 3, at 1477.
11. See id. at 1500–01.
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Notwithstanding the benefits of flooding, in response to the many
flooding events that have occurred since 1927, Congress has systematically
passed numerous laws that were designed to prevent or control flooding.12
These laws in sum were intended to thwart Mother Nature’s will that rivers
and other waterways flood periodically.
Consider, for example, the Mississippi River’s lengthy history of flood-
ing, despite mankind’s unsuccessful attempts to control the natural ten-
dency of the river to flood periodically.  The Mississippi River is the largest
river in North America at 2,300 miles, and America’s efforts to tame it
have resulted in over 80% of the river’s natural floodplain being “pro-
tected” by levees.13  Indeed, nearly 1,800 miles of the river are lined with
levees.14  Nonetheless, the river still has flooded every decade since
1849.15
One of the great floods of the Mississippi River that occurred despite
miles and miles of levees was the Flood of 1927.  From Illinois to Missis-
sippi, 145 breaches in the levees occurred, and over 17 million acres of
land were flooded in seven states with an inland sea 100 miles long created
just north of Vicksburg, Mississippi.16  Billions of dollars in damage
occurred.17
Another major Mississippi River flooding event was the Flood of 1993.
In this event, 40 of 226 federal levees and 1043 of 1345 nonfederal levees
were overtopped or breached.18  Approximately 100,000 buildings were
destroyed or severely damaged.19  Over 500 counties were declared federal
disaster areas.20  The total damages were estimated to be as high as $20
billion.21
In 2005, Hurricane Katrina was another major flooding event.  With a
twenty-one-foot storm surge, at least thirty levees surrounding New Orle-
12. See, e.g., Flood Control Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-391, 45 Stat. 534; Flood
Control Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-738, 49 Stat. 1570; Flood Control Act of 1944,
Pub. L. No. 78-534, 58 Stat. 887; Flood Control Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-298, 79
Stat. 1073 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 701–709 (2012)); see also JOHN M.
BARRY, RISING TIDE: THE GREAT MISSISSIPPI FLOOD OF 1927 AND HOW IT CHANGED
AMERICA 423 (1997).
13. See Klein & Zellmer, supra note 3, at 1477, 1498.
14. See id. at 1480.
15. See id. at 1477–78.
16. See id. at 1481.
17. See id. at 1481–82.
18. See id. at 1493; see also LEE W. LARSON, THE GREAT FLOOD OF 1993 4
(1996), available at http://www.nwrfc.noaa.gov/floods/papers/oh_2/great.htm.
19. See Klein & Zellmer, supra note 3, at 1494; see also Gerald E. Galloway, Jr.,
Corps of Engineers Responses to the Changing National Approach to Flood Plain Manage-
ment Since the 1993 Midwest Flood, 130 J. CONTEMP. WATER RES. & EDUC. 5, 5 (2005).
20. See Klein & Zellmer, supra note 3, at 1494; see also Susan Saulny, Develop-
ment Rises on St. Louis Area Floodplains, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2007), http://www.ny
times.com/2007/05/15/us/15flood.html.
21. See Klein & Zellmer, supra note 3, at 1494; see also Galloway, supra note 19,
at 5.
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ans gave way, and at least 80% of New Orleans was submerged by up to
twenty feet of water.22  Approximately 300,000 homes were destroyed, and
the property damage totaled approximately $100 billion.23
Hurricane Sandy, which came ashore in New Jersey just south of New
York City on October 29, 2012, was the second largest flooding disaster in
America behind only Hurricane Katrina.24  It had a twelve-foot storm
surge in the New York City area, and the damage estimate exceeds $60
billion.25
Given the repeated flooding events that have occurred decade after
decade—despite levees, seawalls, and other flood prevention efforts—it is
not a question of if levees and seawalls will fail.  The question is only when
they will fail.26  Ironically, the construction of levees has resulted in
greater, not lesser, damage because they have created a false sense of se-
curity that has encouraged people to develop land in floodplains.27  Yet,
the governmental agencies responsible for building and maintaining the
levees that will inevitably fail are immune from liability for the damage
that results when their levees fail.28
Levees also have increased flood damage because they have served to
funnel water downstream and, when the levees are breached, the escaping
water gets trapped in the areas near the levee breaches.29  Further, levees
also have caused downstream land erosion because the natural replenish-
ment of downstream areas with sediments dispersed during flood events
has been frustrated or prevented by levees.30  Louisiana, for example, has
22. See Klein & Zellmer, supra note 3, at 1501–02; Bob Marshall, City’s Fate
Sealed in Hours: Timeline Maps Course of Post-Katrina Deluge, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-
PICAYUNE (May 14, 2006), http://www.nola.com/katrina/articles/citys_fate_sealed
_in_hours.html.
23. See Klein & Zellmer, supra note 3, at 1499.
24. See Andy Newman, Hurricane Sandy vs. Hurricane Katrina, N.Y. TIMES BLOG
(Nov. 27, 2012, 4:17 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/27/hurri
cane-sandy-vs-hurricane-katrina/.
25. See id.; see also French, supra note 3, at 463.
26. See ASS’N OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, LEVEES: THE DOUBLE-EDGED
SWORD (2007), available at http://www.floods.org/PDF/ASFPM_Levee_Policy_
Challenges_White_Paper_021907.pdf; see also Klein & Zellmer, supra note 3, at
1520.
27. See Klein & Zellmer, supra note 3, at 1487, 1489, 1495, 1503, 1507–08,
1520.
28. See 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2012); see, e.g., United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597,
604 (1986) (dismissing claims against United States for deaths of recreational boat-
ers who drowned after being swept through open discharge gates of federal flood
control reservoirs).
29. See Klein & Zellmer, supra note 3, at 1501, 1511; Marshall, supra note 22;
see also DAVID M. DRIESEN ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM PUBL’N, AN UNNAT-
URAL DISASTER: THE AFTERMATH OF HURRICANE KATRINA 13–14 (2005), available at
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/unnatural_Disaster_512.pdf (describ-
ing storm surges moving up Mississippi River–Gulf outlet and Gulf Intracoastal
Waterway).
30. See Klein & Zellmer, supra note 3, at 1500–01, 1509; John McQuaid &
Mark Schleifstein, In Harm’s Way: Surging Water Is the Biggest Threat to New Orleans,
7
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lost 1.2 million acres of wetlands since the 1930s.31  As a result of the land
erosion due to levees, it has been estimated that at the time of Hurricane
Katrina, the Gulf of Mexico was, “in effect, probably 20 miles closer to
[New Orleans] than it was in 1965 when Hurricane Betsy hit.”32  Conse-
quently, research suggests that most of the flooding caused by Hurricane
Katrina could have been avoided if the coastal wetlands downstream of
New Orleans had still existed.33
B. The Theoretical Concerns that Led to Private Insurers’ Refusal to Cover
the Risk of Flooding
Unlike “named peril” policies, most homeowners insurance policies
purport to cover “all risks” of loss, except for specific risks that are ex-
pressly excluded.34  Historically, named peril policies only covered one
specified peril.  The first non-marine named peril policy was a fire insur-
ance policy, which originated in London following the Great Fire of
1666.35  In the 1940s and 1950s, insurers began to bundle coverages for
multiple named perils together under one policy.  These policies became
known as “multi-peril” policies.  Under both “named peril” and “multi-
peril” policies, any perils that were not expressly listed as covered were
excluded.36
“All risk” policies were then developed from “multi-peril” policies.37
Unlike “multi-peril” and “named peril” policies, however, “all risk” policies
cover all perils except for the perils that are specifically excluded.38  His-
torically, coverage for the risk of loss due to flooding could be purchased
NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE (June 23, 2002), http://msuweb.montclair.edu/
~furrg/essays/tpnoseries02.html (quoting Windell Curole, General Manager of
South Lafourche Levee District).
31. See Klein & Zellmer, supra note 3, at 1510.
32. See McQuaid & Schleifstein, supra note 30 (quoting Curole) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
33. See Klein & Zellmer, supra note 3, at 1510; America’s Wetland in a Nutshell—
FAQs, AM.’S WETLAND FOUND., http://www.americaswetlandresources.com/back-
ground_facts/basicfacts/FAQs.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
34. See Jeff Katofsky, Subsiding Away: Can California Homeowners Recover from
Their Insurer for Subsidence Damages to Their Homes?, 20 PAC. L.J. 783, 785 (1989) (“In
an ‘all-risk’ policy, all losses except those specifically excluded are covered.  This is the
broadest form of coverage and has been so interpreted by the courts.” (footnote
omitted)).
35. See PETER J. KALIS, THOMAS M. REITER & JAMES R. SEGERDAHL, POLICY-
HOLDER’S GUIDE TO THE LAW OF INSURANCE COVERAGE § 13.02[A][1] (1st ed. 1997
& Supp. 2013) (citing RANDOLPH FIELDS, FINDING LOST TREASURE—HISTORICAL RE-
VIEW OF FIRST PARTY PROPERTY POLICIES 3 (1991)).
36. See id. § 13.02[A].
37. See id. § 13.02[B].
38. See 5 JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAC-
TICE WITH FORMS § 3092 (4th prtg., rev. vol. 1987); 3 NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE
LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 31.06[2][d] (Jeffrey E. Thomas et al. eds., 2011); 10A LEE
R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGULLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 148:50 (3d ed. 1996).
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as an add-on coverage under named peril or multi-peril policies, and all
risk policies covered flood losses unless flooding was expressly excluded.39
Since the Flood of 1927, the losses caused by flooding have been stag-
gering, with the total in the hundreds of billions of dollars.40  Indeed,
flooding is the most common type of disaster in the world, with nine out
of ten catastrophes each year related to flooding.41
Consequently, by the 1960s, insurers had seen enough of flood losses,
and they decided that insuring losses due to flooding generally was not a
risk they wanted to accept.  Almost uniformly, they have refused to insure
flood losses for non-commercial entities despite selling “all risk” home-
owners property policies.42  Thus, they have inserted a flood exclusion in
all homeowners policies that is worded the same as or similarly to the
following:
We do not insure for loss caused directly or indirectly by . . .
Water Damage[, which] means: Flood, surface water, waves, tidal
water, overflow of a body of water, or spray from any of these,
whether or not driven by wind . . . .43
The three primary reasons given for private insurers’ refusal to cover
the risk of losses due to flooding are: (1) the propensity of entities most
likely to suffer from flooding losses to purchase coverage for flooding,
while those unlikely to suffer such losses decline to purchase such cover-
age; (2) the near “certainty of losses in some areas;” and (3) “the ruinous,
widespread nature of flooding events.”44  These concerns associated with
insuring the risk of flooding generally fall under the theoretical headings
of adverse selection, moral hazard, and correlated risks.
1. Adverse Selection
Adverse selection is the tendency of people who are most likely to
suffer losses to purchase insurance to protect against such losses, while the
39. See Scales, supra note 7, at 7.
40. See Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance Program and
Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 61, 62–63, 65–66 (1985); Scales, supra note 7, at 6; Flood
Loss Data, supra note 2.
41. See Houck, supra note 40, at 62.
42. See Warren Kriesel & Craig Landry, Participation in the National Flood Insur-
ance Program: An Empirical Analysis for Coastal Properties, 71 J. OF RISK & INS. 405, 405
(2004).  Contrary to the conventional wisdom that no private insurers will provide
coverage for flood losses, for the right price and for the right policyholders, there
are some insurers that are still willing to provide limited coverage under commer-
cial property policies for floods. See, e.g., Penford Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins.
Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 662 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 2011) (litigating whether policy-
holder, whose manufacturing facility was located on banks of Cedar River, had $50
million or $20 million in coverage for flood losses under “all risk” commercial
property policy issued by AIG and ACE).
43. SAMPLE HOMEOWNERS POLICY, Section I—Exclusions, § A.3, reprinted in
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 206 (5th ed. 2010).
44. Kriesel & Landry, supra note 42, at 405; see also Scales, supra note 7, at 8–9.
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people who are the least likely to suffer losses decline to purchase insur-
ance.45  The foundational premise of the theory of adverse selection is
that policyholders have an informational advantage over insurers about
their risks and that people who know they are high risk buy more insur-
ance than people who are low risk.46
If insurance is sold on a peril-by-peril basis, the idea of adverse selec-
tion makes some sense.  It stands to reason that a person who thinks his
house may be flooded because he lives along a riverbank is more likely to
want to purchase flood insurance than someone who lives on top of a
mountain.
The concept of adverse selection begins to break down, however, if all
of the most common types of risk of loss are bundled together and are
covered under the same insurance policy being sold.  So, for example, if
the homeowners policies available for purchase cover all risks of loss—
including flood, wind, fire, vandalism, etc.—then a person who lives along
a riverbank that is concerned about flooding will not have a greater incen-
tive to purchase the policy than a person who lives on a mountain top and
is more concerned about wind damage than flooding.  If the policyholder
wants or is required to have homeowners insurance to cover any of the
types of risk of loss he may suffer that are covered under all risk policies,
then he will buy the policy regardless of whether he is concerned about all
of the types of risks of loss covered by the policy.
2. Moral Hazard
The concept of moral hazard captures the intuitive idea that people
who have insurance are less likely to take steps to avoid or minimize losses
because the losses will be paid by someone else—the insurer.47  As previ-
ously noted, Judge Easterbrook has described the theory underlying the
concept by stating that, “[o]nce a person has insurance, he will take more
risks than before because he bears less of the cost of his conduct.”48  An-
other commentator has described moral hazard as follows: “What moral
hazard means is that, if you cushion the consequences of bad behavior,
then you encourage that bad behavior.  The lesson of moral hazard is that
less is more.”49
Although the concept of moral hazard has a lot of intuitive appeal,
the pervasiveness of the moral hazard problem in connection with natural
disasters such as flooding is tenuous.  The idea that someone will not
bother to take steps to prevent his house from being flooded simply be-
cause he has insurance ignores the lack of control people have over
45. See supra note 5.
46. See Siegelman, supra note 5, at 1247.
47. See supra note 6.
48. W. Cas. & Sur. Co. v. W. World Ins. Co., 769 F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 1985).
49. James K. Glassman, Editorial, Drop Budget Fight, Shift to Welfare, ST. LOUIS
POST–DISPATCH, Feb. 11, 1996, at B3.
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol60/iss1/2
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-1\VLR102.txt unknown Seq: 11  5-MAR-15 8:23
2015] INSURING FLOODS 63
floods, the real and significant inconvenience of being flooded out of
one’s home, and the significant deductibles contained in many homeown-
ers policies.  For most people, the fact that their house may be repaired in
the future with insurance monies does not mean they would not mind
being homeless for weeks or months while they wait for the insurance
check to arrive and for their house to be repaired.  Most people also do
not relish the prospect of having to call contractors and arrange for the
removal of mud-caked drywall, carpeting, furniture, and personal belong-
ings from their homes.  Similarly, most people also would prefer that their
personal belongings and irreplaceable items of sentimental value, such as
family heirlooms and photos, not be ruined by muddy flood waters.  So,
the idea underlying the concept of moral hazard—that people simply
would not bother to take preventative measures to avoid being flooded if
they have insurance—may have some theoretical appeal, but it overlooks
the reality of actually living through a flood.50
3. Correlated Risks
Correlated risks are risks of loss that happen to numerous people in
concentrated areas at approximately the same time.51  Insurers do not
want to insure correlated risks of loss because they do not believe they can
accurately predict the frequency or severity of such losses or collect
enough premiums to adequately spread the risk of loss across a large
enough pool of policyholders to cover the losses when they occur.52
Although flood events do present correlated risks of loss, it does not
necessarily mean flood losses are uninsurable today.  Correlated risk con-
cerns are most legitimate when an insurer only sells insurance in a limited
geographic area, because the pool of policyholders is limited and all of the
policyholders are likely to face the same types of natural hazards that oc-
cur at the same time (e.g., people who live in the same area share the
50. A better way to address moral hazard concerns is for the insurance policy
to cover, and require the policyholder to take, preventative measures intended to
avoid or minimize a loss.  This coverage is already provided under homeowners
policies, the “sue and labor” provisions of commercial property policies, and even
NFIP policies to a limited extent. See, e.g., John S. Clark Co. v. United Nat’l. Ins.
Co., 304 F. Supp. 2d 758, 767 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (“[T]o be covered as reimbursable
sue and labor expenses [under a commercial property policy], those expenditures
must be made for the benefit of the insurer in mitigating or preventing a covered
loss.” (first alteration in original) (quoting Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc. v. Zurich Ins.
Co., 139 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1385 (S.D. Fla. 2001))); SAMPLE HOMEOWNERS POLICY
§§ E.2.a (Additional Coverages), I.B.4 (Conditions) (requiring homeowner to pro-
tect damaged property against further damage with insurer agreeing to pay costs
incurred to do so), reprinted in ABRAHAM, supra note 43, at 199, 207; FEMA, STAN-
DARD FLOOD INSURANCE POLICY § III.C.2 [hereinafter FEMA, STANDARD POLICY],
available at http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1398950546439-c78022cefaa4
10c9f902076846a0a5a5/F-122_NFIP_DwellingForm_June2014.pdf (covering up to
$1,000 of policyholder’s costs incurred to avoid or minimize losses).
51. See supra note 7.
52. See Bruggeman, Faure & Heldt, supra note 7, at 187; Cummins, supra note
7, at 342–43.
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common risks of flooding, earthquakes, and tornadoes).  Consequently,
when insurance companies only sold policies locally or regionally, corre-
lated risk concerns regarding flooding were understandable.
The negative financial consequences for insurers associated with the
correlated risk of flooding have substantially diminished since the NFIP
originally was created, however, due to the emergence of multinational
insurance companies that sell insurance to policyholders across America
and throughout the world.53  Similarly, the financial impact of correlated
risks also has been diminished by reinsurance, which is now a worldwide
business in which global reinsurers insure all of or portions of another
insurer’s portfolio of business (known as “treaty” reinsurance).54
Insurers today also can further spread the risk of loss associated with
catastrophic events through the sale of catastrophe bonds, pursuant to
which insurers sell bonds for specific types of catastrophes, such as earth-
quakes and hurricanes, to investors who receive interest payments on the
bonds and the return of their principal at the end of the bond term unless
the specified catastrophe occurs, in which case, the insurer keeps the prin-
cipal and ceases to make interest payments on the bonds.55  Since 1996,
insurers have spread their risks through the issuance of $51 billion in ca-
tastrophe bonds while incurring only $682 million in losses for the catas-
trophes covered by the bonds (only 1.3% of the total amount issued).56
Thus, the development of multinational insurance companies, global
reinsurance, and catastrophe bonds means that the pool of insureds and
investors across which the risk of a flood loss in Long Island, for example,
can now be spread are located not only on Long Island, but also across the
entire state of New York and in more distant places throughout America,
Australia, and Europe.
In addition, as is the case with adverse selection, the correlated risk
problem is much greater when perils are insured separately, as opposed to
when coverage for numerous perils is bundled together under the same
policy.  If insurance for flooding is covered only under named peril poli-
cies and sold only regionally, then people who live in the same geographic
flood areas would have a correlated risk of suffering flood losses at the
same time.  If the policies being sold, however, cover floods along with the
other most common perils such as wind, fire, and vandalism, then the
53. American International Group., Inc. (AIG), for example, sells insurance
in 130 countries around the world, had $68.7 billion in revenue in 2013, and has a
market capitalization of approximately $70–80 billion. See Am. Int’l Group, An-
nual Report (Form 10-K), at 212 (Feb. 21, 2013), available at http://www.aig.com/
Chartis/internet/US/en/AIG_2013_AR%20with%2010-K_tcm3171-590454.pdf;
American International Market Cap, YCHARTS.COM, http://ycharts.com/companies/
AIG/market_cap (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).
54. See Cummins, supra note 7, at 343.
55. See Scales, supra note 7, at 46; Al Yoon & Leslie Scism, Investors Embrace
‘Catastrophe Bonds’, WALL ST. J. (April 23, 2014, 6:44 PM), http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424052702304049904579517710350913016.
56. See Yoon & Scism, supra note 55.
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol60/iss1/2
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-1\VLR102.txt unknown Seq: 13  5-MAR-15 8:23
2015] INSURING FLOODS 65
pool of policyholders who would choose to purchase such insurance
would be much more diverse, both geographically and from a risk profile
perspective.  Consider again the example of two policyholders, one who
lives along a river with flooding concerns and the other who lives on a
mountain top with wind damage concerns.  Because the perils of wind and
flooding would be bundled together and sold under the same policy form,
the risks of a flood loss for the two policyholders would not be correlated.
Nor would the risks of wind damage for the two policyholders be corre-
lated.  Thus, bundling coverage for multiple perils together in a single
policy decreases: (1) correlated risk concerns because the pool of policy-
holders likely will have more diverse risk profiles and (2) adverse selection
concerns because more policyholders with diverse risk profiles are likely to
purchase the insurance.
C. The Creation of the National Flood Insurance Program
As a result of insurers’ refusal to cover flood losses due to adverse
selection, moral hazard, and correlated risk concerns, the National Flood
Insurance Program was created through the National Flood Insurance Act
of 1968 to fill the void.57  The NFIP also was created as an attempt to
recoup some of the monies the federal government was spending on post-
disaster relief efforts by getting the people who were most likely to be vic-
tims of flooding to pay premiums to offset some of the post-disaster relief
costs the government was incurring.58
Although purchasing flood insurance under the NFIP is considered
voluntary, a property owner must have flood insurance if the property is
located in a high risk flood area (i.e., the 100-year flood plain) and the
loan used to purchase the property is secured by a federally insured
lender, which currently encompasses the vast majority of loans.59
As deficiencies in the NFIP have been revealed by various flood disas-
ters since 1968, the NFIP has been amended reactively in attempts to ad-
dress the deficiencies.  For example, in 1994, following the Midwest Flood
of 1993, which resulted in the NFIP becoming insolvent due to the combi-
nation of low participation rates and high loss rates, the program was
amended to increase the number of properties that are required to
purchase flood insurance.60  In 2004, when it was realized that many
57. See National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 572
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4127 (2012)).
58. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OVERVIEW OF GAO’S PAST WORK
ON THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 3 (2014) [hereinafter GAO OVER-
VIEW OF PAST WORK], available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-297R;
Klein & Zellmer, supra note 3, at 1490 (citing Rutherford H. Platt, Review of Sharing
the Challenge: Floodplain Management into the 21st Century, ENV’T, Jan.–Feb. 1995, at
25) (“[The NFIP] was also intended to defray the after-the-fact expense of federal
disaster relief by encouraging floodplain occupants to pay premiums before disas-
ter struck.”).
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 4012a.
60. See id. § 4012a(b)(4)(B).
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properties repeatedly are flooded and repaired using NFIP funds, the pro-
gram was amended to attempt to “disincentivize property owners from liv-
ing in areas repeatedly flooded” by providing these property owners
assistance in either elevating the properties or moving.61  In 2012, the pro-
gram, again insolvent in the amount of approximately $17 billion due to
Hurricane Katrina,62 was amended to address the fact that: (1) about 28%
of the policies are sold at substantially subsidized premium rates, and (2)
the flood maps are outdated and inaccurate.63  It remains to be seen
whether actuarially-sound premium rates will ever be charged, because
several coastal states successfully lobbied against the new premium rates
that would be charged to their residents such that Congress recently
passed the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, which
delays the full implementation of actuarially sound premium rates.64
The NFIP currently is administered by the Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency (FEMA), which uses private insurance companies to: (1)
sell the NFIP policies on behalf of FEMA65 in exchange for a 30% sales
commission and (2) handle flood claims when they arise for additional
claims handling fees.66  In 2012, the private insurers that sell NFIP policies
and handle NFIP claims for FEMA, without actually insuring any of the
policyholders’ risks of flood losses, were paid a total of 43.6% of the premi-
ums collected.67
For a property owner to qualify for flood insurance under the NFIP,
the property owner’s community must agree to adopt and enforce ordi-
nances that meet or exceed FEMA requirements to reduce or minimize
the risk of flooding.68  Currently, only 5.5 million of the approximately 72
61. See Aparna Kirknel Majmudar, The National Flood Insurance Program: Main-
taining Its Head Above Water, 16 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 183, 198 (2009).  In
fact, about 1% of the insured properties account for approximately 25% to 30% of
the losses. See Scales, supra note 7, at 13; Rachel Lisotta, Comment, In over Our
Heads: The Inefficiencies of the National Flood Insurance Program and the Institution of
Federal Tax Incentives, 10 LOY. MAR. L.J. 511, 519 (2012).
62. See Ernest B. Abbott, Floods, Flood Insurance, Litigation, Politics—And Catas-
trophe: The National Flood Insurance Program, 1 SEA GRANT L. & POL’Y J. 129, 129–30
(2008).
63. See Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-
141, §§ 100205, 100207, 100216, 126 Stat. 405, 917–19, 927–30 (amending 42
U.S.C. §§ 4001–4127); see also Scales, supra note 7, at 16.
64. See Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No.
113-89, §§ 3–4, 128 Stat. 1020, 1021–22 (2014) (amending 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4001–4127).
65. See Scales, supra note 7, at 14.
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 4012a; see also Scales, supra note 7, at 14.
67. See GAO OVERVIEW OF PAST WORK, supra note 58, at 12.
68. See Scales, supra note 7, at 12; Wayne D. Taylor, Arthur J. Park & Sean
O’Brien, Unique Coverage Issues in Flood Losses, 48 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 619,
622 (2013).
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million homeowners in America purchase flood insurance from the
NFIP.69
1. The Coverage Provided Under NFIP Policies
The maximum amount of NFIP coverage that can be purchased for a
residential property is $250,000 for the building itself and $100,000 for
personal property.70  Coverage for basements, which includes any spaces
below ground level, is limited to only a few items including fuel tanks,
furnaces, and water heaters, which means many things commonly found
or stored in basements—such as drywall, ceilings, carpeting, clothing, elec-
tronic equipment, furniture, and other types of personal property—are
not covered.71  NFIP policies also do not cover property and belongings
that are located outside of the insured building, such as trees, plants, wells,
septic systems, decks, patios, fences, hot tubs, and swimming pools.72
In valuing losses, unlike “guaranteed replacement cost” policies that
pay the cost needed to rebuild the home regardless of the limit of liability
or “valued” policies that pay the full limit of the policy in the event of a
total loss, the policyholder receives the lesser of the replacement cost or
actual cash value (i.e., the depreciated value) of damaged items under
NFIP policies.73  In addition, NFIP policies do not cover the cost of tempo-
rary housing.74
To recover any amount of a loss under an NFIP policy, the policy-
holder must prepare and submit a “proof of loss” form within sixty days
that includes, among other things, bills, receipts, and related documents
even if the claims adjuster assigned by the NFIP program to investigate the
loss does not furnish a proof of loss form or help the policyholder com-
69. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COM-
MITTEES, FLOOD INSURANCE: STRATEGIES FOR INCREASING PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVE-
MENT 2 (2014), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/660309.pdf (stating
there are currently 5.5 million NFIP policyholders); Lisotta, supra note 61, at 518
(“[A] study in 2005 indicated ‘84 percent of residents in flood-prone areas had not
purchased flood insurance . . . .’”); Quynh T. Pham, Note, The Future of the National
Flood Insurance Program in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 629,
652 (2006) (stating, as of 2006, “of the estimated 72 million owner-occupied struc-
tures, only 4.7 million property-owners purchased flood insurance through the
NFIP” (footnote omitted)); Susan Stellin, Reconsidering Flood Insurance, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/11/realestate/reconsidering-
flood-insurance-after-hurrican-sandy.html?_r=0&adxnnl=1&pagewanted=all&adxn
nlx=1413210226-iFUn8c4a2XgRJhRRJJ48Wg (estimating that approximately 18%
of Americans have flood insurance).
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 4013(b)(2), (3); GAO OVERVIEW OF PAST WORK, supra note
58, at 3.
71. See FEMA, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., FEMA F–679, NATIONAL FLOOD IN-
SURANCE PROGRAM: SUMMARY OF COVERAGE 3 (2012) [hereinafter FEMA SUMMARY
OF COVERAGE].
72. See id. at 2.
73. See id. at 4.
74. See id. at 2.
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plete it.75  Generally, the requirement to submit a proof of loss form in
accordance with the terms of NFIP policy is strictly enforced by courts.76
In addition, unlike insurance sold by private insurers, the claims ad-
juster assigned to handle the policyholder’s loss under an NFIP policy
does not have authority to approve or disapprove the claim or to even tell
the policyholder whether his claim has been approved or disapproved.77
2. Litigating Claims Under NFIP Policies
One of the unpleasant surprises policyholders who were unfamiliar
with the terms of NFIP policies discovered in the wake of Hurricane Ka-
trina was that the NFIP flood policies did not actually cover much of their
damages such as landscaping and personal property located in their yards
and basements.78  Another unpleasant surprise for policyholders was that
suing the NFIP or the NFIP’s claims handlers for poor or improper han-
dling of flood claims was generally fruitless.79  Unlike insurance policies
issued by private insurers, FEMA and the private insurers who sell NFIP
policies and then adjust the claims on FEMA’s behalf are not subject to
liability for underpaying claims, handling claims poorly, or even acting in
bad faith, because the NFIP does not allow for recovery for such miscon-
duct and preempts state laws that do provide such relief.80
If it becomes necessary to sue under an NFIP policy in order to col-
lect, the policyholder can only file a lawsuit in federal court and must do
so within one year.81  Failure to file the lawsuit within a year results in the
forfeiture of the claim.82
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM
Poor coverage, low participation rates, and insolvency are three of the
biggest problems with the NFIP.  Hurricane Katrina caused over $100 bil-
75. See FEMA, STANDARD POLICY, supra note 50, § VII.J.3–4.
76. See, e.g., Shuford v. Fidelity Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 1337,
1342 (11th Cir. 2007).
77. See FEMA, STANDARD POLICY, supra note 50, § VII.J.7–8.
78. See Abbott, supra note 62, at 141, 148, 150; LLOYD DIXON ET AL., RAND CTR.
FOR CATASTROPHIC RISK MGMT. & COMPENSATION, FLOOD INSURANCE IN NEW YORK
CITY FOLLOWING HURRICANE SANDY 23–25 (2013), available at http://www.rand
.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR328/RAND_RR328
.pdf.
79. See, e.g., Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., 500 F.3d 390, 393 (5th Cir. 2007)
(holding NFIP does not allow for recovery of extra-contractual damages); Gallup v.
Omaha Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 434 F.3d 341, 344–45 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding extra-
contractual state-law claims are preempted by federal law); Howell v. State Farm
Ins. Cos., 540 F. Supp. 2d 621 (D. Md. 2008) (dismissing extra-contractual claims);
Abbott, supra note 62, at 144–45, 147–50; Scales, supra note 7, at 33–34, 38.
80. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
81. See FEMA, STANDARD POLICY, supra note 50, § VII.R; see also Abbott, supra
note 62, at 144–45, 148.
82. See, e.g., Shuford v. Fidelity Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 1337,
1342 (11th Cir. 2007).
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lion in losses.83  Hurricane Sandy caused over $60 billion in losses.84
These figures account for only $160 billion of the $274 billion in flood
damage caused since 1978.85  So, how much of the $274 billion has been
paid by the NFIP?  As a percentage of the total amount, the NFIP has not
paid much.  As discussed above, very few homeowners actually have flood
insurance.86  And, even for the few people who buy it, NFIP policies often
only cover a portion of a person’s flood losses.87  Consequently, through
March 31, 2014, of the approximately $274 billion of flood losses caused
since 1978, the NFIP has paid a total of $50.6 billion, or about 18%.88  Yet,
despite only paying a small fraction of the total damages related to floods,
the NFIP was insolvent with a deficit of $24 billion as of December 2013.89
A. Poor Coverage and Unfavorable Laws Regarding Claims Handling
The insurance coverage provided by NFIP policies is inadequate.  The
maximum coverage available for a house is $250,000 and $100,000 is the
maximum amount available for a home’s contents,90 which account for
only a fraction of the actual value of many properties that are located in
large population centers such as Boston, New York, and California.  There
also is no coverage under NFIP policies for the vast majority of things com-
monly found in basements and yards.91  Thus, it is not unusual for signifi-
cant portions of a policyholder’s loss to simply not be covered under NFIP
policies.
Even those portions of a policyholder’s loss that are covered, however,
are paid only on an actual cash value basis (i.e., depreciated value), which
means the policyholder is paid pennies on the dollar for his ruined per-
sonal property.92  And, in order to recover those pennies on the dollar,
one must submit a proof of loss form with supporting documentation
within sixty days and then sue within one year if the policyholder disagrees
with the amount paid.93
83. See Klein & Zellmer, supra note 3, at 1499.
84. See French, supra note 3, at 463.
85. See Flood Loss Data, supra note 2.
86. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 70–77 and accompanying text.
88. See FEMA, Loss Statistics Country-Wide as of 3/31/2014, http://bsa.nfipstat
.fema.gov/reports/1040.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2014) (reporting statistics begin-
ning January 1, 1978).
89. See Extreme Weather Events: Limiting Federal Fiscal Exposure and Increasing the
Nation’s Resilience: Testimony before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Af-
fairs, 113th Cong. (Feb. 12, 2014) (statement of Mark Gaffigan, Managing Dir.
Natural Res. and Env’t) [hereinafter Extreme Weather Events], available at http://
www.gao.gov/assets/670/660860.pdf.
90. See 42 U.S.C. § 4013(b)(2), (3) (2012); see also supra note 70 and accompa-
nying text.
91. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 75, 81 and accompanying text.
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Unlike many states’ laws regarding compliance with provisions in poli-
cies sold by private insurers, a policyholder’s failure to strictly comply with
the NFIP policy’s proof of loss and suit limitation provisions results in a
forfeiture of coverage.94  Also unlike a policyholder’s common law and
statutory rights against private insurers regarding poor claims handling
practices or bad faith conduct, the federal government and its agents that
administer the NFIP are immune from liability for such misconduct under
the NFIP.95
In sum, the insurance coverage provided by NFIP policies is limited, a
lot of flood-damaged property is not covered by it, there are numerous
procedural hurdles that the policyholder must clear in order to avoid the
forfeiture of a claim such as filing a proof of loss with supporting docu-
mentation within sixty days, and the NFIP administrators and claims han-
dlers are immune from liability for poor or improper claims handling
conduct.
B. Low Participation Rates and Insolvency
In addition to the problems discussed above, the actual administra-
tion of the NFIP could be used as the poster-child to support the argu-
ment that the federal government should not be in the insurance
business.  The NFIP historically has used outdated floodplain maps due to
a lack of funds to create accurate ones, so in many instances the wrong
homes were insured or uninsured.96  For example, the flood map for the
New York City area that was being used at the time of Hurricane Sandy was
based on data and modeling that were over thirty years old.97  The new
draft of the map for the New York City area that was released in June 2013
essentially doubled the number of houses that are located in the high-risk
flood zones (i.e., the 100-year flood plain).98
The NFIP also is actuarially unsound by design because it intention-
ally has been charging subsidized premium rates for old homes
grandfathered into the program for decades, which has led to frequent
periods of insolvency.99  The NFIP currently owes the U.S. Treasury more
than $24 billion.100
94. See supra notes 76, 82 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text.
96. See Cummins, supra note 7, at 358; Beth A. Dickhaus & Darrin N. Sacks,
Recent Developments in Insurance Regulation, 42 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 571, 582
(2007); GAO OVERVIEW OF PAST WORK, supra note 58, at 37; Kriesel & Landry,
supra note 42, at 406–07.
97. See DIXON ET AL., supra note 78, at 1.
98. See id. at 2.
99. See GAO OVERVIEW OF PAST WORK, supra note 58, at 4.
100. See Extreme Weather Events, supra note 89.  The NFIP program also insures
a lot of recidivist policyholders. See id.  Many homes covered under the program
get flooded over and over again because policyholders were not required to take
preventative measures to avoid flooding under the NFIP unless the repair costs
exceeded 50% of the value of the home. See id.; see also Klein & Zellmer, supra note
18
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In addition, participation in the NFIP has been poor because the
NFIP is a voluntary program and people often do not understand the risk
of flooding for their homes due, at least in part, to: (1) poor communica-
tion of such risks by the NFIP and (2) the outdated and inaccurate flood
maps.101  Many people do not seem to appreciate that a 1% annual
chance of being flooded (i.e., the property is located in a 100-year flood
plain) actually means you have a 26% chance of being flooded during the
course of a 30-year mortgage.102  In the New Orleans area, for example,
only 10% of the homes flooded by Hurricane Katrina had flood insurance
even though the city sits below sea level and is surrounded by water.103  In
the New York City area, a little more than 50% of the homes flooded had
flood insurance even though Manhattan and Staten Island are islands.104
In short, when given a choice, very few people actually purchase NFIP
policies.  Indeed, most homeowners who have flood insurance purchase it
only because they are required to do so in order to get a mortgage if their
home shows up on the 100-year flood plain map.105  At the time of Hurri-
cane Sandy, only about 20% of the homeowners located in areas consid-
ered at high risk for flooding who were not required to have flood
insurance actually had flood coverage, and only approximately 1% of
homeowners located outside of areas designated at high risk for floods
nationwide purchase NFIP policies.106  Consequently, as of the end of
2012, only 5.5 million of the 72 million homeowners in America had a
NFIP policy, which means the vast majority of homes in America do not
have flood coverage.107
3, at 1527; Christine M. McMillan, Comment, Federal Flood Insurance Policy: Making
Matters Worse, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 471, 502 (2007).  Indeed, 1% of the homes covered
in the program account for 30% of the loss payouts due to repeated flooding. See
Bunning-Bereuter-Blumenauer Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-264, § 2(6), 118 Stat. 712, 713 (“[R]epetitive-loss properties comprise approxi-
mately 1 percent of currently insured properties but are expected to account for
25 to 30 percent of claims losses . . . .”); Klein & Zellmer, supra note 3, at 1527;
Scales, supra note 7, at 13; Lisotta, supra note 61, at 13.
101. See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
102. See GAO OVERVIEW OF PAST WORK, supra note 58, at 6, 25; Scales, supra
note 7, at 18; Pham, supra note 69, at 652.
103. See Klein & Zellmer, supra note 3, at 1502; Scales, supra note 7, at 15;
Pham, supra note 69, at 639.
104. See DIXON ET AL., supra note 78, at xvii.
105. See id.
106. See id.; GAO OVERVIEW OF PAST WORK, supra note 58, at 22 (stating that
2006 Rand study estimated that only 1% of homes not located in areas designated
high flood risk areas purchased flood insurance).
107. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE ELIMINATION OF THE FLOOD EXCLUSION IN HOMEOWNERS
POLICIES AS ONE PART OF THE SOLUTION
TO THE FLOOD PROBLEM
If the NFIP is inadequate despite Congress’s continuing efforts over
the past fifty-six years to make it work, is there a better way to insure flood
losses?  Yes, homeowners insurance.  This part shows that, despite impedi-
ments to doing so, the flood exclusion should be eliminated from home-
owners insurance policies.
A. Homeowners Insurance as a Social Necessity
Insurance plays a critical role in society today.  Insurance is a “social
instrument” because it protects the limited assets of individuals by spread-
ing and transferring, through an insurer intermediary, the risk of losses
due to natural and unnatural disasters from the individual to a larger pop-
ulation.108  When this country was founded in the mid-eighteenth century,
people and businesses recognized the importance of insurance as a social
safety net by contributing premiums to a “mutual” company or group to
create a pool of money from which losses caused by the biggest recognized
risk at the time—fire—were paid.109  Essentially, the insurance company
acted as a third-party administrator that collected the premiums to create
the pool of money from which losses would be paid and then paid such
losses as they arose.110
Insurance is even more important now than it was when America was
first founded.  Homeownership is not even possible for most people today
without insurance because anyone who wants to purchase a house using a
bank to finance the purchase is required to have homeowners insurance
in an amount adequate to cover the mortgage.111
Yet, despite the importance of insurance, over the past fifty years, in-
surers have undermined the purpose that insurance serves by hollowing
108. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and Social
Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1489 (2010); see also Deborah A. Stone,
Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 11, 26–29
(1999) (“Because virtually every adult citizen participates in various forms of
mandatory insurance, from automobile liability insurance to unemployment insur-
ance, old-age pensions and disability insurance, everyone is exposed to two of the
moral assumptions of these programs: collective responsibility for the well-being of
individuals and individual responsibility for the well-being of others.”).
109. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 6, at 18; see also JAY M. FEINMAN, DELAY,
DENY, DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE COMPANIES DON’T PAY CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU CAN
DO ABOUT IT 21 (2010); Christopher C. French, The Role of the Profit Imperative in
Risk Management, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1–2) (on file
with author) (arguing that social purpose of insurance is being marginalized by
private insurers’ pursuit of profits).
110. See French, supra note 109, at 1–2.
111. See MARTIN F. GRACE ET AL., CATASTROPHE INSURANCE: CONSUMER DE-
MAND, MARKETS AND REGULATION 83 (2003) (discussing demand for homeowners
insurance, stating that “homeowners insurance . . . is essentially mandatory”);
French, supra note 109, at 11; Stempel, supra note 108, at 1497.
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out the coverages that are provided under numerous lines of insurance,
including homeowners insurance, through the addition of exclusions for
some of the most common catastrophic risks such as floods.112  The trend
toward less and less coverage under “all risk” policies accelerated when
publicly traded stock companies began replacing mutual companies as the
dominant providers of insurance during the past two decades.113
The trend of insurers hollowing out the coverage provided under “all
risk” policies should be reversed, starting with the exclusion for flood
losses.  Homeowners insurance, as a social necessity today, should be re-
quired to cover losses caused by floods.  Indeed, catastrophic risks such as
floods are exactly the types of risk of loss that should be covered under “all
risk” homeowners insurance.  “Removing coverage for the very types of
losses that are most common and have the most devastating impact on
people, businesses and communities is antithetical to the risk transferring”
and social safety net purposes of insurance.114
Although not being done in a coordinated or comprehensive way, in
recent years, we have seen some legislatures moving in the direction of
requiring the insurance industry to actually fulfill the purpose of insur-
ance by requiring that it provide products that serve insurance’s purpose
as a social safety net.  For example, with respect to health insurance, the
Affordable Care Act has: (1) removed insurers’ ability to refuse to insure
certain people, (2) removed insurers’ ability to cancel insurance for peo-
ple who become sick, and (3) reduced insurers’ ability to use reverse ad-
verse selection to charge certain risk classifications prohibitively expensive
premiums.115
Other examples of legislatures enacting statutes to override policy ex-
clusions or to require insurers to cover risks that they would otherwise
refuse to cover can be found in the auto insurance context, where drivers
who insurers refuse to insure because the insurers do not consider the
drivers adequately profitable generally can still get a minimum amount of
liability coverage through state residual risk insurance pools.116  Another
example is states’ passage of statutes that nullify the “innocent co-insured”
exclusion.  Insurers add that exclusion to property policies in an attempt
to prevent innocent co-insureds from recovering under policies for losses
that were expected or intended by another insured such as when an es-
tranged spouse who is no longer living in the couple’s house destroys the
112. See French, supra note 109, at 4.
113. Id. at 1–3; see also Otgontsetseg Erhemjamts & J. Tyler Leverty, The Demise
of the Mutual Organizational Form: An Investigation of the Life Insurance Industry, 42 J.
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 1011 (2010).
114. French, supra note 109, at 39.
115. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, HEALTHCARE SUPPLEMENT
TO ABRAHAM’S INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION 20 (5th ed. 2010).
116. See ABRAHAM, supra note 43, at 771.
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house to prevent the spouse from having it.117  Yet another example is the
state of California’s refusal to enforce exclusions that purport to eliminate
coverage for losses that are concurrently caused by both an excluded peril
and a covered peril if the efficient proximate cause of the loss is a covered
peril.118
In short, when an issue has been deemed sufficiently important, there
are numerous examples of states exercising their regulatory power to re-
quire insurers to cover perils that insurers otherwise would not agree to
cover.
B. Insuring Flood Losses Under Homeowners Policies Would Address
the Problems with the NFIP
All of the problems with the NFIP—poor coverage, lack of accounta-
bility for poor claims payment practices, low participation rates that leave
millions of homeowners uninsured, and the periodic insolvency of the
program—would be addressed if the flood exclusion were eliminated
from homeowners policies.119  Indeed, the NFIP as it currently exists
would no longer even be necessary.
First, standard homeowners insurance policies provide much more
favorable coverage terms than NFIP policies.120  For example, coverage is
not limited to $250,000 for the house itself and $100,000 for the contents
of the house.  In addition, homeowners insurance policies typically pay
losses at replacement cost instead of actual cash value.121
Second, unlike under the NFIP,122 insurers’ claims handling practices
under homeowners policies are governed by state law, not federal law, and
most states provide a remedy for an insurer’s improper handling of a poli-
cyholder’s claim.123  Similarly, unlike the federal law governing the NFIP,
inadvertent claims submission errors by the policyholder such as failing to
117. See French, supra note 109, at 40 n.174; see also JERRY & RICHMOND, supra
note 6, at 425–26.
118. See CAL. INS. CODE § 530 (West 2013); Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 770 P.2d 704, 704–05 (Cal. 1989) (in bank).
119. See Scales, supra note 7, at 43–44.  Due to many of the problems with the
NFIP discussed in this Essay, Professor Scales also proposes in his article regarding
flood insurance that flood losses be covered under homeowners insurance. See id.
120. See, e.g., SAMPLE HOMEOWNERS POLICY § I.C.2 (Conditions), reprinted in
ABRAHAM, supra note 43, at 207 (covering cost to repair or replace damaged prop-
erty without deduction for depreciation, unlike NFIP policies that only pay lesser
of replacement cost or actual cash value which includes depreciation); see also Ab-
bott, supra note 62, at 134–35.
121. See supra note 120.
122. 44 C.F.R. pt. 61, app. A(1), art. IX (“This [flood] policy and all disputes
arising from the handling of any claim under the policy are governed exclusively
by the flood insurance regulations issued by FEMA, the National Flood Insurance
Act of 1968, as amended, and Federal common law.” (citation omitted)); see also
Abbott, supra note 62, at 144–47; Scales, supra note 7, at 32.
123. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
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file a proof of loss timely often do not result in the forfeiture of coverage
under state law.124
Third, including coverage for floods under homeowners policies
would eliminate the participation problem that plagues the NFIP.  Cur-
rently, in contrast to the only 5.5 million homeowners who have NFIP poli-
cies, 96% of the 72 million homeowners in the United States have
homeowners insurance (69 million).125  A related benefit of covering
floods under homeowners policies is that the accuracy of flood maps
would be much less important because a person’s decision whether to
purchase flood insurance would not depend upon whether the person’s
house is included within the 100-year floodplain on a map.
Fourth, because the risk of flooding would be bundled together
under homeowners insurance with all of the other types of coverages such
as fire, wind, and vandalism, the cost of insuring against floods would be
spread across 69 million policyholders instead of 5.5 million.126  Conse-
quently, the total amount of premiums generated to cover flood losses
would be much greater than it is under the NFIP.  Thus, the capital
reserves generated by premiums available to pay flood losses would be
much greater, and the risk of insurer insolvency would be much lower.
Nonetheless, if insurer insolvency were still a concern despite: (1) the
much larger pool of insureds paying premiums, (2) the availability of pri-
vate global reinsurance, and (3) the availability of catastrophe bonds, then
the federal government could act as a reinsurer for losses that exceed a
certain stated amount as it currently does for the risk of losses due to
terrorism.127
Finally, as discussed above in part III.B, in situations where the various
types of perils that are being insured are bundled together under the same
policies—as they are under homeowners policies—the arguments regard-
ing adverse selection, moral hazard, and correlated risks that have been
used to justify private insurers’ historical refusal to cover flood losses do
not carry much weight today.  Because nearly all homeowners carry home-
owners insurance, adverse selection concerns would be negligible.  Moral
hazard concerns regarding flooding are also overstated.  Regardless of
whether they have flood coverage, homeowners cannot control the
weather that causes flooding and homeowners generally are highly moti-
vated to protect their homes due, among other reasons, to the risk of loss
of irreplaceable items of sentimental value and the inconvenience of be-
124. See Abbott, supra note 62, at 144–47; Scales, supra note 7, at 34–35.
125. See Scales, supra note 7, at 18; Homeowners and Renters Insurance—Facts and
Statistics, INS. INFO. INST., http://www.iii.org/facts_statistics/homeowners-and-rent
ers-insurance.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2014).
126. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
127. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat.
2322 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Michelle E.
Boardman, Known Unknowns: The Illusion of Terrorism Insurance, 93 GEO. L.J. 783,
788–89 (2005); Bruggeman, Faure & Heldt, supra note 7, at 230.
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ing homeless.  And, unlike in the years prior to 1968, when the NFIP was
created, because the pool of insureds across which the risk of loss is spread
today is worldwide, the risk of flood losses by the entire pool of insureds is
not correlated.  Thus, due to the creation of multinational insurance com-
panies, the development of the global reinsurance market, and the emer-
gence of catastrophe bonds, the risk of insuring against flood losses in, for
example, Cedar Rapids, would now be spread across the world to policy-
holders and investors in places such as Maine, Switzerland, and New
Zealand.128
C. Insuring Flood Losses Under Homeowners Policies Would Eliminate
Wind Versus Water Damage Litigation
If homeowners insurance covered flood damage, then another added
benefit would be much less litigation following water-related catastrophes
such as hurricanes.  As things currently stand, “policyholders and their in-
surers spend millions of dollars engaged in endless litigation whenever
catastrophes hit.  For example, whenever a hurricane comes ashore and
brings flooding with it, litigation ensues regarding whether the damage to
homes was caused by flooding (an excluded peril) versus wind (a covered
peril).”129  More than 6,600 lawsuits were filed in federal court in New
128. The impact of correlated risks on large, multinational insurers has di-
minished, as insurers have become more global and implemented additional risk
transferring mechanisms, such as reinsurance and catastrophe bonds.  There still
are, however, a substantial number of smaller insurers that sell homeowners insur-
ance on a statewide or regional level.  These smaller, regional insurers would still
have legitimate correlated risk concerns if they were to sell homeowners insurance
that is required to cover correlated catastrophic risks such as floods.  To address
the risk of insurer insolvency for these smaller insurers in the event of a cata-
strophic flooding event, it may need to be mandatory that such insurers purchase
reinsurance or sell catastrophe bonds.  Indeed, it is possible that smaller insurers
could no longer sell homeowners insurance because they may not be able to do so
at competitive rates due to the additional costs they would need to incur to ensure
solvency as a result of the fact they have smaller pools of capital available to cover
the losses associated with catastrophic flooding events.
129. French, supra note 109, at 50; see also Christopher C. French, The “Ensu-
ing Loss” Clause in Insurance Policies: The Forgotten and Misunderstood Antidote to Anti-
Concurrent Causation Exclusions, 13 NEV. L.J. 215, 243 (2012) (discussing “ensuing
loss” clause’s potential impact on wind versus water disputes for hurricane claims);
Erik S. Knutsen, Confusion About Causation in Insurance: Solutions for Catastrophic
Losses, 61 ALA. L. REV. 957 (2010) (discussing concurrent causation with respect to,
among other issues, wind versus water damage caused by hurricanes); see, e.g., Leo-
nard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419, 429–36 (5th Cir. 2007) (analyzing
anti-concurrent causation exclusion in wind versus water dispute following Hurri-
cane Katrina); Corban v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 20 So.3d 601, 611–18 (Miss.
2009) (same).
Notably, because private insurers handle claims under the NFIP on behalf of
the federal government, many insurers that issued homeowners policies were re-
sponsible for estimating the repair costs for both the federal flood policies under
the NFIP program and the insurers’ homeowners policies. See FEINMAN, supra note
109, at 163.  When estimating the cost to remove and replace drywall, for example,
because the insurer was paying the claim with NFIP money instead of its own
24
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Orleans in connection with Hurricane Katrina.130  In Mississippi, due to
insurers’ position that most policyholders’ claims should be denied due to
the flood exclusion, one insurer filed a motion to transfer the lawsuits out
of Mississippi on the basis of a survey that showed that 49% of the people
in southern Mississippi “believe that insurance executives are on the same
level as child molesters.”131  The Louisiana Department of Insurance re-
ceived 20,000 complaints per month during the six-month period follow-
ing the storm.132  Thus, it is an understatement to say there is a high
degree of dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs regarding the pay-
ment of claims following hurricanes in America, largely due to the pres-
ence of the flood exclusion in homeowners policies, and a significant
amount of litigation could be avoided if homeowners policies covered
both wind and water damage.
D. European Countries’ Handling of Insurance for Flood Losses
In considering whether it would be viable for floods to be covered
under homeowners policies in America, one can look to Europe for an
answer.  The United Kingdom, France, and Belgium are three examples to
consider.
In the United Kingdom, insurance for flood losses is mandatory, and
it is covered by private insurers.133  As opposed to selling insurance that
covers just the risk of flooding, the risk of loss due to flooding is bundled
together with multiple types of risk of loss that are covered under the poli-
cies.134  The insurance is available to all property owners and the pre-
mium cannot exceed one-half percent of the amount insured regardless of
where the house is located.135  Despite the fact that insurers’ ability to
refuse to sell insurance to properties located in flood areas is quite limited,
private insurers in the United Kingdom continue to be financially viable
even though the United Kingdom is located on an island that is known for
its rainy weather.136
France is another country where the risk of flood losses is covered by
private insurers and, again, the risk is bundled together with other hazards
instead of being sold as standalone insurance.137  Coverage for floods is
money, one insurer calculated the cost at $.76 per square foot when the costs
would be charged to its homeowners policy, and at $3.31 per square foot when it
would be charged to the federal flood program. See id. at 165.  Presumably, such
practices would cease if insurers were responsible for paying the entire loss.
130. FEINMAN, supra note 109, at 147.
131. Id. at 145 (quoting Eugene Benick, The Flood After the Storm: The Hurricane
Katrina Homeowners’ Insurance Litigation, 4 BUS. L. BRIEF 49, 51 (2007)).
132. Id. at 147.
133. See Majmudar, supra note 61, at 199.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 200–01.
137. See id. at 201–02; see also Olivier More´teau, Policing the Compensation of
Victims of Catastrophes: Combining Solidarity and Self-Responsibility, 54 LOY. L. REV. 65,
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mandatory, and there is no differentiation in the amount of the premium
charged based upon the policyholder’s risk of flood losses.138  To incen-
tivize loss prevention measures, there is a premium discount if the munici-
pality in which the property is located has adopted a “prevention of risk
plan.”139  A state-sponsored program, known as the Caisse Centrale de Re-
assurance (CCR), provides reinsurance to the insurers, receives 50% of
the premiums collected by the insurers, and likewise pays 50% of any
losses.140  France provides an unlimited guarantee of the CCR.141
In Belgium, it also is mandatory that homeowners insurance cover
natural catastrophes, including floods.142  Unlike the French system, the
insurer can adjust the premium based upon the risk of loss presented by
individual policyholders.143  Approximately 50% of the insurers nonethe-
less charge the same premium for all of their policyholders.144  Each indi-
vidual insurer’s risk of losses has a limit, and a state-sponsored “Disaster
Fund” covers any losses above the insurer’s limit.145
In short, the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium are just three
examples of countries that are successfully insuring the risk of flooding in
a way similar to the proposal in this Essay.
E. Impediments to Change
To avoid insuring flood losses under homeowners policies when faced
with the elimination of the flood exclusion, insurers likely will point to:
(1) the concept of freedom of contract and the notion that they should be
free to cover whatever risks they choose,146 and (2) the purported unprof-
86 (2008).  Germany is another country where flood insurance is covered by poli-
cies sold by private insurers, and the risk of loss due to flooding is bundled to-
gether with coverage for other natural disasters such as earthquakes. See
Majmudar, supra note 61, at 203.
138. See Majmudar, supra note 61, at 202.
139. See Michael Faure & Ve´ronique Bruggeman, Catastrophic Risks and First-
Party Insurance, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 44 (2008).
140. See id. at 45; More´teau, supra note 137, at 89.
141. Faure & Bruggeman, supra note 139, at 45; More´teau, supra note 137, at
90.
142. See Faure & Bruggeman, supra note 139, at 45–46.
143. See id. at 46.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. This argument ignores, of course, the fact that insurance policies are
contracts of adhesion sold on a take it or leave it basis in which the policyholder
has no input regarding the language contained in the policy. See JEFFREY W. STEM-
PEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES § 4.06[b], at 4–37 (2d ed. 1999) (“In a
sense, the typical insurance contract is one of ‘super-adhesion’ in that the contract
is completely standardized and not even reviewed prior to contract formation.”);
Michelle Boardman, Insuring Understanding: The Tested Language Defense, 95 IOWA L.
REV. 1075, 1091 (2010) (describing “hyperstandardization” of insurance policies);
James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation?:
Text Versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995, 996 (1992) (“The only part of the standard
policy that is generally customized to the consumer-insured is the Declaration
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itability of insuring flood losses due to adverse selection, moral hazard,
and correlated risk concerns.  Such arguments have carried the day for the
past sixty years, which is why we still have the NFIP program.  As discussed
in part III.B, although such arguments have much less force today than
they did in the past, the insurance industry’s lobby is strong—as evidenced
by the fact that insurance regulators have repeatedly approved policy
forms that contain the flood, and other, exclusions for decades.  Indeed,
private insurers have great financial incentive to avoid covering floods be-
cause they currently are being paid more than 40% of the premiums col-
lected by the NFIP in some years without assuming any of the risk to pay
for flood losses.147
Insurers also likely will argue that they would not be permitted to
charge actuarially sound premiums if policies are required to cover flood
losses.  Insurers made such arguments in recent years when they were
forced to continue selling homeowners policies that covered wind damage
caused by hurricanes in coastal states.148  The correct response to such
arguments is, of course, to allow insurers to charge a higher premium to
reflect the fact that the policies are now insuring an additional risk.  How-
ever, in light of the fact that the additional risk assumed by insurers would
be spread across approximately 69 million policyholders with a wide range
of risk profiles, instead of just the 5.5 million homeowners who currently
are covered by the NFIP and live almost exclusively in areas known to be at
a high risk for flooding,149 the average additional premium that should be
charged to each individual policyholder when the risk pool is viewed as a
whole should be quite limited.150
Sheet . . . .  [T]here is little, if any, freedom to negotiate the standardized language
of the insurance contract that determines the scope of coverage.”); Susan Randall,
Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 125 (2007) (“[I]n some lines
of insurance, all insurance companies provide identical coverage on the same take-
it-or-leave-it basis.”); Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1153
(1990) (“[P]roperty owner’s liability insurance contracts are standardized across
insurers in a form few insureds have the power or experience to bargain
around.”).
147. See GAO OVERVIEW OF PAST WORK, supra note 58, at 12.
148. See French, supra note 109, at 29–30; Donald T. Hornstein, Natural Disas-
ters and the Financing of Fat Tails: Lessons from the Economics and Political Economy of
Weather-Related Insurance 4, 6 (2013) (UNC Legal Studies Research Paper No.
2249904), available at http:\\ssrn.com\abstract=2249904 (describing Allstate’s,
Farmers Insurance’s, and Farm Bureau’s withdrawal from insurance markets in
Florida and North Carolina when they did not obtain regulatory approval for their
requested premium rate increases, despite fact that premium rates already had
been increased by 77% in Florida between 2001 and 2006); Elisabeth A. Ondera,
Testing the Waters: The South Carolina Coastal Captive Insurance Act as Part of a Mul-
tifaceted Approach to the Coastal Insurance Conundrum, 59 S.C. L. REV. 599, 600
(2008).
149. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
150. Ideally, to accomplish the broadest spreading of the risk of flood losses,
nationwide premium rates would be charged with only modestly higher, but not
actuarially based, premium rates being charged to high risk properties, similar to
the way the Affordable Care Act allows only limited premium variation based upon
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Requiring private insurers that sell homeowners insurance to cover
flood losses also likely would meet strong political opposition in this politi-
cally polarized country.  To some people, requiring homeowners policies
to cover flood losses, in combination with the existing laws that require
homeowners to purchase homeowners insurance, would be viewed as a
form of socialism.  The reality, however, is that insurance already is a
highly regulated industry where public policy and social concerns such as
the compensation of innocent victims play a large role.  States already reg-
ulate insurers by, among other things, approving policy language, approv-
ing premium rates, and establishing capital surplus requirements.151
States also already manage guaranty associations to cover claims submitted
to insolvent insurers, and states already have insurance programs for auto
drivers that insurers refuse to accept as policyholders.152  Consequently,
eliminating the flood exclusion from homeowners policies would simply
be another example, in a long list of examples, of states exercising their
regulatory power over the insurance industry.
Other people will object to including flood coverage in homeowners
insurance policies because it would result in premium subsidization.  Un-
less there were numerous risk classifications based upon where a person’s
home is located and the flood prevention measures in place—which
would in some respects defeat the purpose of bundling flood coverage
together with other perils in a single policy form—then people who live in
areas with a low risk of flooding would to some extent be subsidizing the
premiums of the people in higher risk areas.  That already occurs, how-
ever, under homeowners policies because coverage for all risks is provided
under such policies regardless of whether the policyholder actually needs
or wants coverage for all of the risks.  So, policyholders are already paying
for some coverages they do not need but other people do.153  Indeed, that
factors such as the insured’s age and smoking history. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ,
supra note 115, at 13.  Although many global insurers sell homeowners insurance
across the country, homeowners insurance is currently sold, priced, and regulated
on a state-by-state basis.  Consequently, unless that were to change, greater pre-
mium subsidization would occur by lower risk residents located in states with
higher risks of flooding, such as coastal states, because the risk of flood losses
would be spread directly only to the other homeowners in the state.  Insurers, how-
ever, would still be able to indirectly spread the risk of loss to entities outside of
such states through the insurers’ corporate relationships with other insurers, rein-
surance, and catastrophe bonds. See supra notes 51–56 and accompanying text.
151. See ABRAHAM, supra note 43, at 119, 122–24, 133–37; JERRY & RICHMOND,
supra note 6, at 90–94.
152. See ABRAHAM, supra note 43, at 124, 771–73. See generally Spencer L. Kim-
ball & Noreen J. Parrett, Creation of the Guaranty Association System, 19 J. INS. REG.
259 (2000).
153. The reality, of course, is that subsidization already occurs under all lines
of insurance and, ironically, taxpayers currently are subsidizing the NFIP in the
approximate amount of $24 billion, even though many people are uninsured for
flood losses and many people who are insured for flood losses are not paid in full
for such losses when they occur. See Kristen Uhlenbrock, Despite Hazard of Sea Level
Rise, Senate Halts Flood Insurance Reforms, THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Jan. 31, 2014, 10:37
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is one of the very reasons why flood coverage should be included in home-
owners policies.  It would make flood coverage more affordable and dra-
matically increase the participation rates.  Yet, in a country that highly
values individual rights, many people likely will object to being required to
subsidize their fellow Americans’ insurance rates even if: (1) the cost of
doing so is only a nominal amount, and (2) they already are subsidizing
the premium rates of other policyholders without realizing it.154
To crystallize the difficulties associated with changing the flood insur-
ance landscape in America in significant ways, one need only consider
what has happened with the Affordable Care Act.  It was passed only when
Democrats held the majority in both houses of Congress, and it has been
subject to more than fifty attempts to repeal or change it since Republi-
cans obtained a majority in the House of Representatives.155  If something
as important as ensuring that everyone in this country is able to obtain
health care has met so much political resistance, then it is doubtful that
the political will currently exists to pass legislation that would result in
everyone being covered for something undoubtedly of less importance—
flood losses.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite accounting for 90% of all natural disasters and annually caus-
ing billions of dollars in damages, only about 7% of homeowners in
America have insurance coverage for flood losses.  And the insurance cov-
erage that the 7% does have from the NFIP, effectively the sole provider of
AM), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2014/01/31/3230141/senate-flood-insur
ance/.  Thus, the current system requires mandatory subsidization by all taxpayers
for a flood insurance program that provides only poor coverage to the small per-
centage of homeowners who actually participate in the program.
154. One example of a state in which inland homeowners currently subsidize
the homeowners insurance premium rates of coastal homeowners, due to the
greater risks the coastal homeowners face, is Florida. See Cassandra R. Cole et al.,
The Use of Postloss Financing of Catastrophic Risk, 14 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 265,
267–71 (2011).  The dominant homeowners insurance provider in Florida is Citi-
zens Property Insurance Corporation, a state-sponsored program. See id. at 269.  It
offers property insurance to homeowners in Florida at premium rates, significantly
lower than private insurers, because: (1) it does not need “to provide adequate
returns to investors;” (2) it is tax exempt; (3) it does not need to raise excessive
amounts of capital to pre-fund losses because it has the ability to do post-loss assess-
ments; and (4) it is reinsured by a state-sponsored reinsurer, the Florida Hurricane
Catastrophe Fund. See id. at 267–71.  The premium rates charged to coastal re-
sidents are also subsidized by inland residents in varying amounts depending upon
the location of the insured property. See id. at 280–85.  Despite problems with the
program in the past, and the fact that the state of Florida is periodically pounded
by hurricanes, the program has successfully provided affordable property insur-
ance to the state’s residents where private insurers generally have refused or failed
to do so. See id. at 269.
155. See Ed O’Keefe, The House Has Voted 54 Times in Four Years on Obamacare.
Here’s the Full List., WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/03/21/the-house-has-voted-54-times-in-four-years-on-
obamacare-heres-the-full-list/.
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flood insurance for homeowners in America, is not very good.  It does not
cover a significant amount of the losses that a typical flood victim incurs
and the administrators of the NFIP, as well as their private claims handlers,
are immune from liability no matter how poorly they handle claims or
treat policyholders.  The NFIP is also insolvent without a current path to-
ward solvency.
Homeowners insurance, instead of the NFIP, would be a better vehi-
cle through which to insure against the risk of flood losses.  Far more
Americans would have flood coverage at reasonable rates if coverage for
flood losses were included in homeowners insurance and the coverage it-
self would be much better.
The justifications historically used to allow insurers to refuse to cover
the risk of flood losses—adverse selection, moral hazard, and correlated
risks—have much less force today than they did in 1968 when the NFIP
was created.  Insurance is now a global business by which the risk of loss of
any individual policyholder or group of policyholders in any given geo-
graphic area is spread across a worldwide pool of premium-paying in-
sureds and investors.  Consequently, the time is ripe for the federal
government to get out of the flood insurance business and for insurers to
get back in the business.
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